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ARTICLE
ECONOMIC HARDSHIP AS COERCION
UNDER THE PROTOCOL ON
INTERNATIONAL TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS
BY ORGANIZED CRIME ELEMENTS
Linda A. Malone*
80,000 women and children from Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos,
and China have been sold into Thailand's sex industry
since 1990.
5,000-7,000 Nepali girls, some as young as nine, are trafficked
into the red light districts of India each year. 200,000
Nepali girls, mostly under fourteen, have been trafficked
into India in the last decade.
Afghani women are sold into prostitution in Pakistan for 600
rupees per kilogram.
Albanian women are regularly trafficked into Italy, more than
10,000 in the last five years.
45,000-50,000 women and children from Asia, Latin America,
and Eastern Europe are trafficked for sexual exploitation
into the United States. The going rate for a woman or
child sold to the U.S. sex trade is between $12,000 and
$18,000.
10,000 children between six and fourteen are enslaved in
brothels in Sri Lanka.
5,000 children from ten to sixteen are sold into sexual slavery
in Cambodia every year.
300,000 women have been trafficked into the Western Euro-
pean sex trade in the last ten years.
20,000 women are in brothels in the Czech Republic, most
are from the former U.S.S.R.
10,000 Albanian women have been trafficked into Italy in the
last five years and forced into prostitution.
250 women from Romania, Moldova, and the Ukraine were
discovered in Bosnia in the last two years having been traf-
ficked and forced into prostitution.
* Marshall-Wythe Foundation Professor of Law, William and Mary Law School,
Williamsburg, Virginia.
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Five women from Moldova were discovered in a Phnom Penh,
Cambodia brothel in 2000.
Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia have become sex centers for
Western Europeans. The women trafficked there are from
the former Soviet Union.
1,000 women trafficked from the former U.S.S.R. into Israel
became prostitutes in exchange for legal documentation.
3,000 Nigerian women have been forced into prostitution in
Italy.
2,000,000 women and children are held in sexual servitude.
Eighty percent of them are under the age of twenty-four
and roughly fifty percent of them were internationally traf-
ficked from one country to another.
Fifteen percent of the sexually exploited population, or
30,000 women and children, die every year equivalent over
a ten-year span to the number killed by atomic bombs in
Hiroshima and Nagasaki.1
INTRODUCTION
The United Nations ("U.N.") in December 2000 adopted an
International Convention Against Transnational Organized
Crime 2 with a Protocol on international trafficking by organized
crime elements.' In part, the adoption of the Protocol was a re-
sponse to the inadequacy, and disgracefully inadequate ratifica-
tion, of the 1949 Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic
in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others4
("1949 Convention"). Only twenty-five percent of the world's
States had ratified the 1949 Convention. In addition, there are
no regional treaties addressing the problem of sexual trafficking.
1. INT'L HUM. RTS. L. INST., DEPAUL UNIv. COLLEGE OF LAW, INVESTIGATING INTER-
NATIONAL TRAFFICKING IN WOMEN AND CHILDREN FOR COMMERCIAL SEXUAL EXPLOITATION
1 (2001).
2. United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, U.N. Doc.
A/55/383, Dec. 12-15, 2000, available at http://www.uncjin.org/Documents/Conven-
tions/dcatoc/finaldocuments_2/convention-eng.pdf [hereinafter Convention
Against Organized Crime].
3. Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Wo-
men and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transna-
tional Organized Crime, U.N. Doc. A/55/383, Dec. 12-15, 2000, available at http://
www.uncjin.org/Documents/Conventions/dcatoc/finaldocuments-2/convention-%
20traff-eng.pdf [hereinafter Protocol on Trafficking].
4. Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploita-
tion of the Prostitution of Others, Dec. 2, 1949, opened for signature Mar. 21, 1950, 96
U.N.T.S. 272 (entered into force July 25, 1951) [hereinafter 1949 Convention].
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Formulation of a universal treaty on sexual trafficking was
complicated by a normative debate over whether and when a wo-
man could "consent" to prostitution and trafficking. Although
there are certainly some situations in which the outcome of that
debate is significant, these situations are hardly representative
of, or relevant to, the vast majority of the victims of sexual traf-
ficking, and totally irrelevant to the plight of the millions of chil-
dren who have been sexually exploited. At the very least the
harsh reality of prostitution and sexual trafficking mandates a
presumption that prostitution generally, and sexual trafficking
in particular, are not truly consensual practices on the part of
the women involved. This presumption is manifest in the new
Protocol. The focus of this Article is two-fold: (1) to distinguish
the situations in which a woman's "choice" is compelled by eco-
nomic hardship from the limited situations in which a woman
chooses prostitution and trafficking in a fully informed and un-
fettered, and thus, consensual decision; and (2) to demonstrate
that decisions compelled by economic hardship as a matter of
international law fall within the definition of coercion for sexual
offenses generally and sexual trafficking in particular.
I. EXISTING INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROTECTIONS
AGAINST TRAFFICKING
The international prohibition of trafficking is set out in the
1949 Convention.5 This Convention stems from the amalgama-
tion of preceding treaties drafted to address the phenomenon of
"white slavery."6 The 1949 Convention binds States to three gen-
eral obligations: an anti-trafficking principle, specific enforce-
ment measures, and the use of social welfare to "rehabilitate"
survivors.7 Both acts of procurement and exploitation of prosti-
tution, such as pimping and brothel management, are prohib-
ited and rendered punishable by the 1949 Convention. Addi-
tionally, States parties to the Convention agree to undertake de-
5. See Protocol amending the International Agreement for the Suppression of the
White Slave Traffic, May 18 1904; International Convention for the Suppression of the
White Slave Traffic, May 4 1910, May 4, 1949, 2 U.S.T. 1997.
6. See Cherif Bassiouni, Enslavement as an International Crime, 23 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
POL. 445 (1991) (profiling these historical treatises).
7. See Susan Feanne Toepfer & Bryan Stuart Wells, The Worldwide Market for Sex: A
Review of International and Regional Legal Prohibitions Regarding the Trafficking in Women, 2
MICH. J. GENDER & L. 83, 93 (1994).
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fined measures of international coordination to combat
trafficking as well as to take social and economic action for the
prevention of prostitution and rehabilitation of victims.8
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Dis-
crimination Against Women9 ("CEDAW") binds States to actively
combating discrimination against women in all aspects of social
and economic life. The trafficking provision, Article 6, man-
dates that "States parties shall take all appropriate measures, in-
cluding legislation, to suppress all forms of traffic in women and
exploitation of prostitution of women."'0 The Optional Protocol
to CEDAW now provides a mechanism through which victims of
trafficking and others can communicate a complaint against a
State party and seek enforcement of States parties' obligations
under the Convention." The CEDAW committee has addressed
trafficking under the rubric of violence against women calling
for the elimination of such violence through the Declaration on
the Elimination of Violence Against Women and General Rec-
ommendations on Violence Against Women.' 2 Additionally, the
Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action calls for the elimina-
tion of trafficking and advocates assistance for the victims.'"
The League of Nations Slavery Convention of 1926 and the
Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the
Slave Trade and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery
(1957) indirectly address aspects of trafficking by prohibiting
slavery, 4 debt bondage 15 and forced marriages.16 The Interna-
8. See id. (giving a more in-depth analysis of the 1949 Convention).
9. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
Mar. 1, 1980, 1249 U.N.T.S. 14 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981) [hereinafter
CEDAW].
10. Id. art. 6.
11. See Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination
against Women, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1999, arts. 2, 5, 11.
12. See id. (defining violence against woman as, in part, "[p]hysical, sexual and
psychological violence occurring within the general community, including rape, sexual
abuse, sexual harassment and intimidation at work, in educational institutions and else-
where, trafficking in women and forced prostitution.").
13. See id. (citing Strategic Objective D.3. to eliminate trafficking in women and
assist victims of violence due to prostitution and trafficking).
14. See League of Nations Slavery Convention, 60 L.N.T.S. 253 [hereinafter 1926
Convention], reprinted in 21 AM. J. INT'L L. 171 (Supp. 1927) (defining slavery as "the
status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right
of ownership are exercised."); Charles Jacobs & Mohamed Athie, Bought and Sold, N.Y.
TIMES, July 13, 1994, at A19. Traditional forms of slavery are practiced today in places
such as the Sudan and Mauritania.
2001]
58 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 25:54
tional Labor Organizations ("ILO") Forced Labor Convention 17
and the 1957 Abolition of Forced Labor Convention18 are inte-
gral for legally defining the broad phenomenon of trafficking
because they provide the international legal definition of forced
labor and mandate the end to forced labor practices.' 9
In respect to the trafficking of girls and boys under eigh-
teen, States parties to the Convention on the Rights of the Child
("CRC") are bound to take "all appropriate national, bilateral
and multilateral measures to prevent the abduction of, sale of or
traffic in children for any purpose or in any form. 2 ° In addi-
tion, other substantive provisions of the CRC further address
States parties' obligations regarding the sexual and economic ex-
ploitation of children. 2'
Finally, there are international and regional human rights
instruments, which both directly and indirectly address traffick-
ing. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights22
("ICCPR") and the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights23 ("ICESCR") are relevant to framing traf-
15. See 1926 Convention, supra note 14. The Convention defines debt-bondage as:
The status or condition arising from a pledge by a debtor of his personal ser-
vices or of those of a person under his control as security for a debt, if the
value of those services as reasonably assessed is not applied towards the liqui-
dation of the debt or the length and nature of those services are not respec-
tively limited and defined.
Id. In the trafficking context, debt-bondage is used to hold victims in slavery-like condi-
tions. Victims are told that they must pay off the debt of their transportation by work-
ing. Usually, victims are not told how much they owe, how much their work is bringing
into the exploitative establishment, nor how long they will need to work to pay off the
debt.
16. See id.
17. International Labour Organization, Forced Labour Convention 1930, No. 29,
available at http://ilolex.ilo.ch:1567/english/convdispl.htm.
18. Abolition of Forced Labour Convention 1957, No. 105, available at http://
ilolex.ilo.ch: 1567/english/convdispl .htm.
19. See Stephanie Farrior, The International Law on Trafficking in Women and Children
for Prostitution: Making it Live Up to its Potential, 10 HARv. HUM. RTs. J. 213, 219-24
(1997).
20. See Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 12, G.A. Res. 44/25, Annex,
U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 166, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989), revised by U.N.
Doc. A/RES/44/25/Corr.1 (1990), reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 1457 (1989).
21. See Farrior, supra note 19, at 233 (discussing the Convention on the Rights of
the Child ("CRC") and these provisions).
22. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, G.A.
Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966),
999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR].
23. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16,
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ficking as a human rights issue, as they detail and ensure the
collection of core human rights.2 4 Victims of trafficking experi-
ence multiple violations of individual rights guaranteed them
through these documents. For example, rights violated through
the trafficking process include, among others, the right to life,
and the right not to be tortured or subjected to cruel and de-
grading treatment;25 the right to liberty and security of person
and to be free from physical violence; 26 the right to freedom of
choice of residence and movement;27 the right to consensual
marriage, and equal rights in divorce and marriage;21 the right
to work and just, fair, and safe work conditions; 29 and the right
to education, health, and social services.3"
Regional treatises, specifically the European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms3'
("European Convention") and the American Convention on
Human Rights3 2 ("American Convention") prohibit trafficking
either implicitly or explicitly.33 The American Convention ex-
plicitly prohibits "traffic in women" in Article 6(1) and the Euro-
pean Convention prohibits slavery, servitude, and forced labor
in Article 4. The practice of trafficking clearly fits within this
prohibition. 4
Although there are international legal norms that prohibit
different aspects of trafficking and bind States to the elimination
of trafficking, there is a pervasive failure of international instru-
ments to be precise about both the meaning of trafficking and
specific actions that must be taken to combat it. For instance,
1966, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter ICESCR].
24. See Farrior, supra note 19, at 225-33.
25. ICCPR, supra note 22, art. 9.
26. Id. arts. 6, 9.
27. Id. art. 12(1).
28. Id. art. 23(2)-(4); ICESCR, supra note 23, art. 10(1).
29. ICESCR, supra note 23, arts. 6-7.
30. Id. art. 12.
31. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953) [hereinaf-
ter European Convention].
32. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970)
(entered into force July 18, 1978).
33. See Toepfer & Wells, supra note 7, at 113-28 (providing a broader discussion of
these documents' applicability to trafficking).
34. See id.
20011
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until such time as a complaint regarding trafficking is made
under the Optional Protocol to CEDAW, CEDAW's provision on
trafficking has vague language and undefined terms making the
legal contours and implications of this provision unclear.3 5 As a
result, the U.N. by way of its Special Rapporteur on Violence
Against Women has recognized the lack of a coherent interna-
tional definition on trafficking. 6 Advocates for trafficked wo-
men agree; for example, the Global Alliance Against Traffic in
Women ("GAATW") asserts that "a fundamental problem in re-
sponding to the issue of trafficking in women is the lack of a
precise and coherent definition. 37
The 1949 Convention is currently the only international le-
gal instrument that provides a definition of trafficking. The
Convention sets out to punish a person who, in relevant part,
"procures, entices or leads away, for purposes of prostitution, an-
other person, even with the consent of that person" and a per-
son who "exploits the prostitution of another person, even with
the consent of that person. '"38 The critical aspects of this defini-
tion are: 1) its connection of physical recruitment with commer-
cial exploitation as aspects of trafficking; 39 2) its limitation on
trafficking as only for the purpose of prostitution; 3) its failure to
define both "prostitution" and particularly "exploitation; ''40 and
4) the element of "with or without consent."
A. From "With or Without Consent" to "Coercion and Deception"
The 1949 Convention states that persons cannot consent to
being trafficked. The European Parliament and advocates for
trafficking victims have argued that instead of focusing on the
issue of consent, the emphasis of any rights-based definition
should be on whether a person was trafficked by deceptive or
35. See Farrior, supra note 19, at 227; Toepfer & Wells supra note 7, at 100 (analyz-
ing CEDAW's trafficking provision more deeply).
36. See Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, U.N. Eco-
nomic and Social Council, 53d Sess., Agenda Item 9(a), at 19 (1997).
37. See FOUND. AGAINST TRAFFICKING IN WOMEN AND THE GLOBAL ALLIANCE AGAINST
TRAFFICKING IN WOMEN, SUMMARY INTERNATIONAL REPORT ON TRAFFICKING IN WOMEN,
FORCED LABOR AND SLAVERY-LIKE PRACTICES IN MARRIAGE, DOMESTIC LABOR AND PROSTI-
TUTION [hereinafter GAATW SUMMARY REPORT], available at http://www.inet.co.th/
org/gaatw/sum-irp.htm.
38. See 1949 Convention, supra note 4, art. 1.
39. See GAATW SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 37.
40. See Toepfer & Wells, supra note 7, at 99.
[Vol. 25:54
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coercive means.4 Although both the 1949 Convention and the
current U.N. contemporary definition do not include the ele-
ment of coercion and/or deception, adding such an element to
an international trafficking prohibition would clarify issues left
ambiguous by the 1949 Convention and more clearly shape the
legal analysis.
A shift away from the issue of consent refocuses the legal
inquiry from the victim and onto the actions of the trafficker/
exploiter, reflecting a recognition that deception or coercion
nullifies any meaningful, fully informed consent. This would
make clear that a person, in the absence of coercion and/or de-
ception, has a right to choose to migrate and to choose their
form of labor. The increased attention on deception and/or co-
ercion serves to clearly distinguish trafficking from other forms
of cross-border movement of persons. Voluntary migration
within and across borders with the assistance of profiting third
parties, both legal and illegal, is standard practice in the eco-
nomically motivated migration flows of today. By virtue of the
deception and/or coercion aspect of the definition, trafficking is
rendered a separate offense from alien smuggling and other
such practices.
To shed light on what constitutes coercion and deception,
GAATW provides an illustrative list of forms that "coercion" can
take in their Draft Minimum Standards for the Treatment of Vic-
tims of Trafficking in Persons, Forced Labor and Slavery-like
Practices.42 This list includes:
" violence or threat of violence, including deprivation of
freedom of movement and of personal choice, abuse of au-
thority or dominant position: which "can range from con-
fiscation of personal documents to the placing of another
in a dependent position, abusing one's dominant social po-
sition, abusing one's parental authority or abusing the vul-
nerable position of persons without legal status,"
* deception: with regard to the working conditions or the
41. See European Parliament Resolution of January 18, 1996 (calling for a new
convention on trafficking which should consider coercion and deception); see also
GAATW SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 37.
42. See GAATW, Draft Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Victims of
Trafficking in Persons, Forced Labor and Slavery-like Practices (1997) [hereinafter
GAATW Draft Standard Minimum Rules], available at http://www.inet.co.th/org/
gaatw/SMR.htm.
2001]
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nature of work to be done.43
Notably, GAATW does not include economic circumstances
as a form of coercion in its guidelines or in the Human Rights
Standards. Some activists have advocated that extremely harsh
economic circumstances can constitute coercion.44 It has been
highly controversial, however, to categorize dire economic cir-
cumstances that motivate women and female children to migrate
and seek clandestine labor, particularly in the case of prostitu-
tion, as coercion for the purposes of defining trafficking.
B. Defining Forced Labor
Forced labor is a component of the trafficking phenome-
non and its legal definition in turn impacts upon trafficking defi-
nitions. The ILO Convention defines forced labor as "all work
or service that is extracted from any person under the menace of
any penalty and for which the said person has not offered him-
self voluntarily."4 5 The inquiry into whether a person is subject
to forced labor hinges on assessing the willingness or consent of
the victim to the coercive labor situation. Many advocates have
argued that the meaning of voluntary in a definition of traffick-
ing for forced labor would require that any consent to labor
must be full and informed as to the coercive nature of the situa-
tion for it to be valid. 46  Thus, in an expansive prohibition
against trafficking, a person would be a victim of trafficking for
forced labor if that person was not fully informed as to the coer-
cive conditions and exploitative nature of their resulting work
situation and therefore was not able to offer their labor volunta-
rily.
43. See id.
44. See Janie Chuang, Redirecting the Debate over Trafficking in Women: Definitions,
Paradigms, and Contexts, 11 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 65, 93 (1998) (stating that the issue of
economic deprivation amounting to coercion is particularly relevant for women who
return to their country and region of origin after being trafficked and take part in
recruiting new girls to take their place. This cyclical aspect of trafficking is rooted in
the harsh social and economic realities that women face when they are released from
their original coercive situation, particularly from sex work. Some advocates believe
these and similar circumstances can amount to economic coercion into the trade in
human beings).
45. See Convention Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labor (1930), modified 38
U.N.T.S. 3 (1949), available at http://ilolex.ilo.ch:1567/english/convdispl.htm.
46. See Alison Steward, Report from the Roundtable on the Meaning of "Traffick-
ing in Persons": A Human Rights Perspective (1998) (unpublished draft, on file with
author).
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The definition of forced labor reflects that a person, if fully
informed, may opt to work in exploitative circumstances because
other options, such as returning to their country of origin in the
case of migrants or being unemployed in a country which pro-
vides little or no governmental subsistence, are less socially and
economically attractive. In the Human Rights Standards,
GAATW agrees with this implication and explicitly recognizes
the right of adults to "chose abusive or exploitative working con-
ditions as preferable to other available options."47 In the area of
trafficking for sexual exploitation, many advocates have argued
that a person can consent to prostitution as a form of labor if the
person is not "forced" through coercive or deceptive means."
Even meaningful consent to exploitative working condi-
tions, however, does not relieve exploiters from prosecutions for
trafficking when other forms of coercion and deception, such as
restrictions on freedom of movement or appropriating the legal
identity of the person, are used to maintain control over the per-
son.49 Any use of coercion or deception in the migration, work-
ing, or living conditions of a person should render facilitators
and exploiters vulnerable to trafficking prosecutions.
C. A New International Agreement
To address this growing transnational crime, the United
States introduced a resolution on trafficking in women and chil-
dren at the April 1998 session of the U.N. Commission for Crime
Prevention and Criminal Justice. The proposed resolution
called for the development of a protocol on trafficking in wo-
men and children under the proposed U.N. Convention Against
Transnational Organized Crime5" ("Convention"). The resolu-
tion was subsequently adopted, and the United States and Ar-
gentina introduced a draft protocol at the first negotiation ses-
sion of the Convention in January 1999. The resulting Protocol
to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Espe-
cially Women and Children51 ("Protocol") promises to be the
47. See GAATW, Foundation Against Trafficking in Women, International Human
Rights Law Group, Human Rights Standards for the Treatment of Trafficked Persons,
Jan. 1999.
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. Convention Against Organized Crime, supra note 2.
51. Protocol on Trafficking, supra note 3.
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first comprehensive international anti-trafficking agreement
with tough law enforcement and victim protections.
Five factors contributed to the development of the Protocol.
First, nongovernmental organizations ("NGOs") lobbied their
governments on behalf of trafficking victims who had suffered
egregious human rights violations and exposed the practices of
traffickers. Traffickers frequently exercise complete control
over their victims by seizing travel and identification documents,
withholding wages, restricting or banning movement, prohibit-
ing communication with family and friends, taking advantage of
language barriers, selling victims to another owner to keep them
disoriented, threatening family members, inflicting beatings and
rapes, forcing abortions, starving the victims, forcing drug use,
imposing twenty-hour workdays, and using contraction of HIV/
AIDS and sexually transmitted diseases against the victims.
Second, it is widely projected that the sheer number of traf-
ficking victims will continue to increase without intensified con-
trols. Currently, the International Organization for Migration
estimates that 150 million people migrate annually in search of
economic opportunity or to escape gender discrimination,
armed conflict, political instability, and poverty. According to a
U.S. State Department study, approximately two million of these
migrants are trafficked each year because traffickers take advan-
tage of migration, crisis, and economic and social disadvantages
to procure their victims.
Third, trafficking is a transnational organized crime that re-
quires a global response. Trafficking is the third most profitable
illegal industry, behind drugs and arms, estimated at U.S.$7 bil-
lion by the International Organization for Migration. Fourth,
few nations have enacted laws to combat this growing transna-
tional crime. Finally, as noted above, the existing body of inter-
national trafficking law is inadequate as a tool to combat traffick-
ing. Given the increase in trafficking and inadequate laws to
combat it, the global community was ready for the creation of a
new agreement governing trafficking in persons. 52
On November 15, 2000, the U.N. General Assembly
adopted the Convention Against Organized Crime,5" which con-
52. See generally Kelly E. Hyland, The Impact of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and
Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, 8 HuM. RTs. BRIEF 30 (2001).
53. Convention Against Organized Crime, supra note 2.
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tains a Protocol on migrant smuggling 54 and a protocol on traf-
ficking in persons." From December 12-15, 2000, the Conven-
tion was opened for signature in Palermo, Italy. The trafficking
Protocol is the first international instrument to define traffick-
ing, and it does so comprehensively. Under the Protocol, Article
3 defines trafficking as:
"the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or re-
ceipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or
other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception,
of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability, or of
the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the
consent of a person having control over another person, for
the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a
minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or
other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services,
slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal
of organs."56
The success of achieving consensus on a definition cannot be
understated. The Protocol reflects the first international con-
sensus on the definition of trafficking, which is the first step to-
ward a concerted international effort to combat trafficking.
Debates over the significance of consent also occur with re-
spect to trafficking, or the recruitment or transportation of wo-
men for forced labor/slavery-like practices, although the traffick-
ing debates tend to be less sharply divided57 and differ in other
ways from those over prostitution. The prostitution debates
threaten to remove the distinction between prostitution and
forced prostitution in contrast to the trafficking debates which
focus more on trafficking as distinct from the broader category
of illegal immigration. Despite this difference in focus a com-
parison between the prostitution and trafficking debates is use-
54. Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplement-
ing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, U.N. Doc.
A/55/383, Dec. 12-15, 2000, available at http://www.uncjin.org/Documents/Conven-
tions/dcatoc/finaldocuments 2/convention-smug-eng.pdf.
55. Protocol on Trafficking, supra note 3.
56. Id. art. 3.
57. Whereas those who view prostitution as inherently exploitative can invoke the
imagery of prostitution as a physical act of violence against womens' bodies, those who
view trafficking as inherently exploitative lack recourse to such visceral representations.
Instead, any inherently exploitative nature of the trafficking lies in the ill intentions of
the traffickers ultimately to place a woman in the hands of someone who will subject
her to forced labor/slavery-like practices. See generally Chuang, supra note 44.
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ful because these two debates share similar questions regarding
the significance of consent.
As with its definition of forced labor/slavery-like practices,
the GAATW definition of trafficking requires coercion in the re-
cruitment or transportation of the woman.5 s In contrast, the
U.N. General Assembly ("UNGA") definition of trafficking does
not require coercion as a necessary element of the violation:
[Trafficking is defined as the] illicit and clandestine move-
ment of persons across national or international borders,
largely from developing countries and some countries with
economies in transition, with the end goal of forcing women
and girl children into sexually or economically oppressive
and exploitative situations for the profit of recruiters, traffick-
ers and crime syndicates, as well as other illegal activities re-
lated to trafficking, such as forced domestic labor, false mar-
riages, clandestine employment and false adoption.59
By not requiring coercion, the UNGA definition does not
appear to admit the possibility that a woman could consent to
the trafficking. Assuming that the act of recruitment is inher-
ently exploitative, the UNGA's definition reflects the view that
women should not be able to engage in consensual trafficking.60
To allow a woman to consent to the trafficking would make it
extremely difficult to distinguish trafficking from illegal migra-
tion, an outcome which the UNGA views as unacceptable be-
cause a person's voluntary migration across frontiers without au-
thorization is substantively different from trafficking of a person
58. Coercion includes "violence or threat of violence, abuse of authority or domi-
nant position, debt bondage, deception or other forms of coercion." See infra text ac-
companying note 67.
59. Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, supra note 36,
at 19.
60. In its report to the 50th session of the General Assembly, the Secretary-General
of the United Nations commented that:
The question must be asked .. .whether trafficking is the same as illegal mi-
gration. It would seem that the two are related, but different. Migration
across frontiers without documentation does not have to be coerced or ex-
ploitative. At the same time, persons can be trafficked with their consent. A
distinction could be made in terms of the purpose for which borders are
crossed and whether movement occurs through the instrumentality of another
person. Under this distinction, trafficking of women and girls would be de-
fined in terms of "the end goal of forcing women and girl children into sexu-
ally or economically oppressive and exploitative situations" and the fact that it
is done "for the profit of recruiters, traffickers and crime syndicates.'
See NOTRAF, Background Study, 2.4.
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with that person's consent. Unlike illegal migration, trafficking
occurs at the control of another person, and has the purpose of
forcing the person into a forced living or working situation.
The UNGA distinction between illegal migration and traf-
ficking has the distinct advantage of focusing attention on the
violation of the woman's rights, rather than on the illegality of
her act.6" Characterization of a woman who consents to be traf-
ficked as simply engaging in illegal migration is treating the wo-
man as a collaborator of the trafficker and overlooks the traf-
ficker's underlying exploitative purposes. Acknowledging the
distinction between trafficking and illegal migration has the sig-
nificant practical advantage of encouraging States to provide
trafficked women protections that States might otherwise deny
to illegal immigrants. Otherwise States might conclude that a
woman who consented to the trafficking, as any other illegal mi-
grant, does not deserve special protections for having knowingly
violated State sovereignty by illegal border-crossing.6 2 In this way
a State could deny protections to a woman who consented to be
trafficked, even if she was later subjected to a forced or slavery-
like living or working situation.6"
Insisting on the distinction between trafficking and illegal
immigration in theory negates a woman's autonomy to migrate
to another country or region. The UNGA view may be charac-
terized as paternalistically denying the possibility that a woman
might consciously and freely choose to use a trafficker for the
purposes of her own migration.64 In both the prostitution and
the trafficking contexts, the issue of whether to require coercion
as a material element at least in theory raises difficult normative
choices. Eliminating the coercion requirement might render
more women eligible to receive protection and remedy under
international laws against trafficking and forced labor/slavery-
like practices. Eliminating the coercion requirement also risks
61. Similarly, in the prostitution context, a focus on the abusive conditions under
which a forced prostitute works could draw attention away from the illegality of her
activity in countries that prohibit prostitution.
62. See infra notes 135-138 and accompanying text.
63. Indeed, a woman who also initially intended to engage in illegal but voluntary
prostitution in the destination country, but ended up in a forced prostitution situation,
could be denied protections by the State on grounds that, in addition to intending to
immigrate illegally, she intended to engage in another crime once within the destina-
tion country.
64. Chuang, supra note 44, at 89-90.
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treating women as victims, incapable of making choices about
their bodies and their means of migration.
Whether to require a coercion element in the definitions of
prostitution does not determine whether coercion should be re-
quired for trafficking. A coercion requirement for prostitution
could be maintained and yet coercion could be irrelevant to the
question of whether one has been victimized by trafficking. As-
suming coercion to be relevant to the determination of whether
a woman has been victimized by trafficking and/or forced la-
bor/slavery-like practices, the question of how coercion is to be
assessed must still be determined.
Fundamentally, the determination of whether the circum-
stances of a woman's decision to engage in prostitution, domes-
tic labor, or marriage amount to the requisite level of coercion
turns on two questions: (1) procedurally, at what point in a se-
quence of events is coercion or a lack of consent dispositive of a
woman's victimization; and (2) more substantively, what consti-
tutes coercion or lack of consent. The complexity of these in-
quiries has perhaps best been illustrated with reference to what
has been referred to by one commentator as the "Re-entry Sce-
nario."6 5 The Re-entry Scenario describes the situation of a wo-
man who, having escaped or having been released from debt
bondage as a forced prostitute, "voluntarily" decides to re-enter
the trafficking industry as a prostitute, believing that alternative
forms of employment would be unavailable to her due to the
social stigma against former prostitutes. The fact that the wo-
man was initially trafficked and forced into prostitution gives rise
to the question of when in the trafficking scenario the lack of a
woman's consent becomes dispositive of her status as victim.
Furthermore, the possibility that the woman's decision to re-
enter prostitution in this scenario may have been driven by eco-
nomic hardship gives rise to the substantive question of what
constitutes coercion.
This scenario illustrates how the question of whether or not
economic hardship constitutes a form of coercion can drastically
affect the outcome of the analysis. If economic hardship does
not constitute coercion, the woman in the Re-entry Scenario
would not be considered a victim of forced prostitution. If it
does constitute coercion the question then becomes whether or
65. Chuang, supra note 44, at 90.
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not the "choice" to re-enter prostitution was genuinely voluntary
in the context of extreme hardship.66 For instance, had job
training programs been available to these women as part of an
effort to facilitate their reintegration into mainstream society,
perhaps these women would have had a viable opportunity to
leave prostitution and pursue some other means of survival.
The current proposed definitions of trafficking and forced
labor/slavery-like practices differ in the extent to which eco-
nomic hardship serves as an indicator of coercion. For instance,
the GAATW definitions do not explicitly identify economic coer-
cion in their list of coercive factors: "violence or threat of vio-
lence, abuse of authority or dominant position, debt bondage,
deception or other forms of coercion." Admittedly, "other forms
of coercion" could be construed to include economic coercion.
However, given that GAATW probably was familiar with the de-
bates over whether or not prostitution is inherently exploitative
and with the claims that economic conditions are a source of
that exploitation, the absence of "economic coercion" in the list
is most likely to be the result of a conscious exclusion. In elabo-
rating on the meaning of "violence or threat of violence," "de-
ception," "abuse of authority," and "debt-bondage and practices
similar to debt-bondage" in its definitions of trafficking and
forced labor/slavery-like practices, NOTRAF, a network of Euro-
pean organizations, which includes member organizations of the
GAATW, makes no mention of economic coercion." In con-
66. Case histories compiled by Human Rights Watch/Asia indicate that there are a
number of women who feel that after having been forced to work in a brothel, their
only alternative is to continue prostituting themselves.
67. In its Basic Principles for a Code of Conduct, NOTRAF explains that [florce
can take various forms, including, but not limited to:
* violence or threat of violence, including deprivation of freedom (e.g., of
movement, or personal choice);
* deception, inter alia with regard to working conditions and/or the nature of
the work to be done;
" abuse of authority, ranging from confiscation of personal documents to
bringing or keeping a person in a position of dependence by abusing one's
dominant social position or abusing the vulnerable position of persons with-
out legal status;
* debt-bondage and practices similar to debt-bondage, i.e., pledging the per-
sonal services or labor of a person as security for a debt, if the value of those
services or labor as reasonably assessed is not applied towards the liquida-
tion of the debt, or the length and nature of those services or labor are not
limited and defined.
NOTRAF, supra note 60, at 2.
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trast, the UNGA at least acknowledges economic need to be a
contributing factor of trafficking. By describing trafficking as a
phenomenon that originates largely in developing countries and
economies in transition, and by including "economically oppres-
sive" situations in its description of the end goals of trafficking,
the UNGA acknowledges the role of economics in both the re-
cruitment process and the exploitative living and working condi-
tions.
While including economic hardship as a form of coercion
certainly would increase the number of trafficked women eligi-
ble for protection under international law, it is undeniably diffi-
cult to identify clearly the level of economic hardship sufficient
to constitute coercion. If the baseline were economic equality
between men and women, most women would be considered vic-
tims or potential victims, given their generally lower economic
status relative to men. Unlike physical or emotional coercion,
defining economic coercion poses the necessity of a comprehen-
sive understanding of the socio-economic factors that can influ-
ence women's decision-making.
II. DECISIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNALS IN YUGOSLAVIA AND RWANDA
The statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia68 ("ICTY") contains no explicit references to
sexual violence despite the systematic use of rape, sexual enslave-
ment, forced impregnation, and forced births during the war in
Bosnia. Prosecutions for sexual violence were due in large part
to the commitment of the first prosecutor, Richard Goldstone,
and women's advocacy groups to see that the Tribunal addressed
these offenses in its development of international criminal law.
By contrast, one year later, the statute of the International Crimi-
nal Tribunal for Rwanda69 ("ICTR") contained detailed provi-
68. Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsi-
ble for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Terri-
tory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993) [hereinafter
ICTY Statute].
69. Statute of International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Re-
sponsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian
Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for geno-
cide and other such violations committed in the territory of neighboring States, be-
tweenJanuary 1, 1994 and December 31, 1994, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994) [hereinaf-
ter ICTR Statute].
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sions concerning sexual violence in its definitions of war crimes,
crimes against humanity, and genocide. The first trial held
before the ICTY, the Tadic case,70 resulted in several decisions of
significance to sexual violence against women, although the
most critical allegations leading to his conviction involved forced
sexual violation of males by other males.
The Jelisic and Cesic "Brcko" indictment is unique because it
focuses exclusively on sexual assaults, with particular emphasis
on the humiliation and degradation inflicted by the assaults.
The Gagovic and others, "Foca" indictment charges Gagovic with
crimes against humanity, grave breaches, and war crimes for rap-
ing a woman to punish her for reporting other rapes to him, and
for intimidating her by "saying that he would find her in five
different countries if she told anyone. '"71
Akayesu 72 before the ICTR was the first international tribu-
nal decision finding an individual guilty of genocide. Leading to
a decision of expansive significance for gender-related violence,
the indictment defined sexual violence to include "sexual abuse,
such as forced nudity."7 Testimony addressed the forced nudity
of women and young girls "in the close or immediate presence"
of Akayesu for the purpose of their humiliation. The judgment
included as crimes of sexual violence forced nudity, as well as
forced marriage, forced abortion, forced miscarriage, rapes spe-
cifically intended to humiliate, sexual slavery, forced prostitu-
tion, and sexual enslavement. The expansive inclusion of these
offenses supports the view that sexual violence can be predicated
on mental abuse and coercion, independent of physical force.
Several of the pending indictments have far-reaching conse-
quences for further elaboration of the concept of coercion short
of physical force. As noted above, the "Brcko" indictment" is a
landmark indictment because it involves exclusively sexual as-
70. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case no. IT-94-1-T, Opinion andJudgment (May 7, 1997).
Decisions of the ICTY are available at http://www.un.org/icty/index.html.
71. See generally Kelly D. Askin, Developments in International Law, 93 AM. J. INT'L L.
97 (1999).
72. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case no. ICTR-96-4-I, Judgment (June 17, 1997). Deci-
sions of the ICTR are available at http://www.ictr.org.
73. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case no. ICTR-96-4-I, amended Indictment, 10A (June
17, 1997).
74. Prosecutor v. Jelisic and Cesic, "Brcko," Case no. IT-95-10 (Jul. 21, 1995),
amended Case no. IT-95-10-PT (Mar. 3, 1998).
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saults. In the "Foca" indictment, 75 as mentioned earlier, one of
the accused threatened his rape victim that" . . . he would find
her in five different countries if she told anyone ' 76 and for that
he is charged with crimes against humanity (torture, rape), grave
breaches (torture) and war crimes (torture). More significantly
with respect to coercion, in counts related to the operation of a
brothel, the accused was charged with crimes against humanity
(enslavement and rape), grave breaches (inhuman treatment),
and war crimes (outrages upon personal dignity). These counts
are exceptional not only because enslavement was charged for
crimes of sexual violence, but also because the detainees were
neither guarded nor locked in, but could not escape because the
territory was surrounded by Serbs. Several counts of the indict-
ment are based on detention of women in various dwellings by
only one individual.
The sexual terrorism in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda
has inevitably led to further exploitation and prostitution of
many of the victims. Within these cultures the sexual violence
will continue, only in a different form brutal poverty, social ex-
clusion, and, unavoidably in many cases, prostitution.
III. THE WOMEN'S INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES
TRIBUNAL 2000 FOR THE TRIAL OF JAPANESE
MILITARY SLAVERY
The Tokyo Tribunal 2000 grew out of the demand of Asian
women for apology and compensation for their exploitation as
"comfort women" by the Japanese military during World War II.
A minimum of 200,000 women and girls were subjected to rape,
sexual slavery, trafficking, torture, and other forms of sexual vio-
lence. The Charter of the Tribunal7 7 established jurisdiction
over crimes against humanity, including, but not limited to, sex-
ual slavery, rape, and other forms of sexual violence, enslave-
ment, torture, deportation, persecution, murder, and extermina-
tion. In addition to determinations of individual responsibility,
75. Prosecutor v. Gavovic and others, "Foca," Case no. IT-96-23, (June 23, 1996)
(primary sexual violence indictment), amended Case no. IT-96-23 (July 13, 1998) (bring-
ing solo charges against one of the accused, Kunarac).
76. Id.
77. Charter of the Women's International War Crimes Tribunal on Japan's Mili-
tary Sexual Slavery (Incorporating Modifications Agreed Upon During The Hague
Meeting, Oct. 26-27, 2000), available at http://www.iccwomen.org/tokyo/charter.htm.
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the Charter authorized the Tribunal to determine State respon-
sibility for "international wrongs" including concealment or fail-
ure to find and disclose the truth concerning these crimes; fail-
ure to prosecute and provide reparations; failure to take mea-
sures to protect the integrity, well being, and dignity of the
human person; discrimination; and failure to take the necessary
measures to prevent recurrence.
In its preliminary factual findings, the Tribunal found that
"comfort stations," other sexual slavery facilities, and a complex
trafficking network were established to compel women to pro-
vide sexual services. This "coercion" often included recruitment
by deceptive promises. The Tribunal concluded that rape and
sexual slavery committed on a widespread, systematic, or large-
scale basis constitute crimes against humanity. According to the
Tribunal, "enslavement" includes "forced or deceptive transfer"
of a human being as one's property.
IV. PERSECUTION COMPELLING FLIGHT FOR PURPOSES OF
REFUGEE STATUS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
In the landmark case of In re Kasinga,7 Fauziya Kasinga ap-
pealed an immigration judge's decision of August 25, 1995, de-
nying her political asylum, which she had claimed on the
grounds that she would be forced to undergo female circumci-
sion in her own country. The Board of Immigration Appeals
("Board") reversed, granted asylum, and ordered her admitted
to the United States as an asylee. The Board held: (1) that the
practice of female genital mutilation ("FGM") 79 can be the basis
for a claim of persecution; (2) that young women who are mem-
bers of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe of northern Togo who
have not been subjected to FGM as practiced by that tribe, and
who oppose that practice, are recognized as members of a partic-
ular "social group" within the definition of the term "refugee"
under section 101 (a) (42) (A) of the Immigration and Nationality
78. In re Fauziya Kasinga, 20 I & N Dec. 357, 361 (BIA 1996), 1996 WL 379826, 35
I.L.M. 1145 (1996).
79. This practice has also been termed "female circumcision," "traditional female
genital surgery' ("FGS"), and "Irua." The nomenclature alone is a controversial sub-
ject. See Hope Lewis, Between Irua and Female Genital Mutilation: Feminist Human Rights
Discourse and the Cultural Divide, 8 HARv. HUM. RTS. J. 1, 2-3 (1995). In In reKasinga, the
court uses the term "FGM." For purposes of consistency, this Article will use the same
terminology.
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Act (8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (42) (A)); and (3) that Kasinga had es-
tablished that a reasonable person in her circumstances would
fear countrywide persecution in Togo on account of her mem-
bership in this recognized social group, justifying an award of
political asylum.
In re Kasinga was brought before the Board for a hearing en
banc in an unusual posture. In its first hearing en banc, the gen-
eral counsel of the Immigration and Naturalization Service
("INS") argued for a broader formulation of political asylum
based on FGM than did counsel for the applicant. Counsel for
applicant argued her client's position within "traditional princi-
ples of asylum jurisprudence,"8 ° narrowly tailoring the grounds
for asylum to the specific facts of the case. In contrast, the gen-
eral counsel proposed a framework of analysis for all asylum peti-
tions premised on the practice of FGM. The result is a narrowly
written majority decision that seems deliberately minimalist to
de-emphasize its significance, with two concurring opinions
joined by three Board members and one dissent without opin-
ion. Given the INS's acknowledgment that FGM could be
grounds for asylum, the majority claimed it need only address
whether this particular applicant was entitled to asylum on the
basis of the record.8 1
Kasinga, a nineteen year-old native of Togo, is a member of
the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe of northern Togo. Young women
of that tribe normally undergo FGM "of an extreme nature caus-
ing permanent damage" at age fifteen. 2 Kasinga's influential fa-
ther protected her from the practice until his death. On his
death, however, her father's sister became the family authority
figure under tribal custom and her mother was driven from the
home. The aunt arranged a polygamous marriage to a man, and
with him she planned to force Kasinga to submit to the proce-
dure before consummation of the marriage. After fleeing to
Ghana and Germany, Kasinga sought asylum in the United
States where she had other relatives. Her aunt had reported her
to the Togolese police, who were looking for her."
The Board evaluates asylum cases on their merits only if it
80. In re Kasinga, 20 I & N Dec. at 361.
81. Id. at 369.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 358-59.
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first finds that the facts asserted by an asylum applicant are true
by a preponderance of the evidence. Thus, the Board's compre-
hensive review of the initial asylum hearing began with an inde-
pendent inquiry into the credibility of Kasinga and her factual
claims. Although the immigration judge had found Kasinga irra-
tional, unpersuasive, and inconsistent, the Board, in a lengthy
discussion, found Kasinga rational, plausible, and consistent.84
The Board next considered whether Kasinga's factual claims
met the statutory criteria for asylum under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101 (a) (42) (A). The Board found that Kasinga feared "perse-
cution," her fear was well-founded, her "persecution" was "on ac-
count of' her membership in a specific "social group," and she
was unable to return to her country of nationality.
With little discussion, the Board found Kasinga's fear that
she would be forcibly circumcised to be well-founded. Several
documents, including a report by a sociologist who had studied
the various cultures of Togo and a memorandum prepared by
the Department of State on FGM in Togo, confirmed that the
traditions and mores of Kasinga's tribe mandate the mutilation
of women intending to marry. Mutilation rates in Kasinga's tribe
range from eighty-five to ninety-eight percent.
The Board devoted somewhat more discussion to the first of
the two central questions in this case: whether or not FGM as
practiced by Kasinga's tribe constitutes "persecution." This ques-
tion has sparked fierce debate among academics and activists.
Universalists argue that fundamental human rights norms tran-
scend culture; cultural relativists argue that defining FGM as
84. Id. at 357. Kasinga's story was subsequently corroborated by her family in
Togo. See Cindy Shiner, Persecution by Circumcision: Woman Who Fled Togo Convinced U.S.
Court but Not Town Elders, WASH. POST, July 3, 1996, at Al. Her mother, who had given
her almost all of her own U.S.$3,500 inheritance, eventually had to ask the family patri-
arch to forgive her and allow her to live in his home. Celia W. Dugger, A Refugee's Body
is Intact but her Family is Torn, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1996, at Al. The INS sought a
remand in part based on credibility determinations. The majority had little difficulty
dispensing with these issues because they were based on purported inconsistencies in
the applicant's statements that did not affect the issues to be resolved. The opinion also
emphasized that a remand was not necessary given the length of time her application
had been pending. In re Kasinga 20 I & N Dec. at 364. The applicant spent eight
months in INS detention in several facilities, including one closed by a riot. Question-
ing this long-term detention in light of the applicant's age, the novel issue presented by
her case, and the lack of any known criminal record, the majority members suggested
that "the Commissioner and the General Counsel might well wish to review the policy
should future cases of this type arise." Id. at 35 I.L.M. 1145 n.1.
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''persecution" challenges the cultural autonomy of the nations in
central Africa and the Arabian Peninsula that practice FGM.
The World Health Organization, among other organizations,
takes a universalist position, proclaiming FGM a form of violence
against women and girls that violates "universally recognized
human rights standards. 8 5
Kasinga's case extensively documented the effects of female
genital mutilation, its international condemnation, and the poor
human rights record of Togo, particularly with respect to wo-
men. In describing female genital mutilation and finding that
the described level of harm constituted persecution, the majority
relied heavily on the FGM Alert prepared by the INS Resource
Information Center 6 and a memorandum of May 26, 1995, from
Phyllis Coven in the Office of International Affairs of the INS on
the 1995 gender guidelines.8 7 The opinion also noted two State
Department reports on human rights abuses in Togo.
The court, implicitly adopting the universalist approach, ac-
cepted the position shared by Kasinga and the INS that there is
no legitimate reason for FGM. Documents in the Board pro-
ceeding accurately defined FGM as the partial or total removal
of the prepuce, clitoris, and inner and outer labia. In Togo, the
practice involves clitorectomy, usually performed with crude in-
struments and without anesthetic. A State Department research
report conducted and compiled by the Demographic Research
Unit in the record of the Board's proceeding indicated that
most Togolese excisors interviewed perform mutilations with ra-
zor blades, claiming that surgical knives are expensive and too
difficult to clean. Girls in Kasinga's tribe are typically mutilated
at fifteen years of age; mutilation just prior to marriage would
not be uncommon.8 8
The Board defined persecution as "the infliction of harm or
suffering by a government, or person a government is unwilling
or unable to control, to overcome a characteristic of the vic-
85. In addition to condemnation by international governmental organizations, the
International Federation of Gynecology and Obstetrics, the Council on Scientific Af-
fairs, the International Medical Association, and the American Medical Association
have also condemned FGM. In re Kasinga 20 I & N Dec. at 366.
86. Id. at 361.
87. Id. at 362.
88. Id.
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tim. ''89 Intent to punish is not a necessary element of persecu-
tion. Kasinga clearly established both harm and suffering: if cir-
cumcised, she could expect severe pain, shock, hemorrhage, tet-
anus or sepsis, urine retention, ulceration of the genital region,
and injury to adjacent tissue. These effects alone might prove
fatal; assuming her survival of the procedure, long-term conse-
quences could include cysts and abscesses, keloid scar formation,
damage to the urethra resulting in urinary incontinence, dys-
pareunia, and a severely compromised, if not eradicated, capac-
ity to experience sexual pleasure.
The Board never addressed the second element of persecu-
tion: whether the harm or suffering was inflicted by a govern-
ment or persons a government is unable to control. Yet this stat-
utory element lies at the core of feminist critique of asylum law,
as most torture experienced by women-including FGM-is in-
flicted by private, rather than public, agents. Indeed, persecu-
tion within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (42) (A) has been
difficult to establish in FGM cases because the perpetrators are
often private citizens acting in a private capacity-usually, as
here, relatives-without express State authority. Here, as is typi-
cal, the government does not perform the mutilations, and did
not threaten to do so in Kasinga's case. At most, the Board had
documents noting that no laws in Togo specifically outlaw FGM.
The Board presumably accepted this as proof that the Togolese
Government is unable or unwilling to control the agents of per-
secution.
The Board then turned to the second central question:
whether FGM, once designated persecution, is persecution
against a protected group. The Refugee Convention9' and the
Refugee Act of 198091 confer refugee status only upon those per-
sons who can show persecution on the basis of their membership
in one of five statutorily defined groups.92 Gender-the group
in which Kasinga would most logically claim membership-is not
89. Id. at 365 (citing In re Acosta, 19 I & N Dec. 211 (BIA 1985), modified on other
grounds, In re Moghrabi, 19 I & N Dec. 439 (BIA 1987)).
90. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150;
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 UST 6223, 606 U.N.T.S.
267.
91. Immigration and Nationality Act, Title VII, ch. 2, 8 U.S.C. § 1521 (1999).
92. These categories are race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular so-
cial group, or political opinion. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (42) (A) (1994).
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among them.93 Like all women seeking asylum on the basis of
forms of persecution that exclusively or predominantly affect wo-
men (e.g., rape, FGM), Kasinga had to establish that she was a
member of a "social group" singled out for persecution by per-
sons whom her government was unable or unwilling to control.
Kasinga relied upon, and the Board accepted, her designa-
tion as a member of a social group otherwise persecuted. The
Board narrowly tailored the definition of social group to the
facts of the case: young women of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe
who have not had FGM, as practiced by that tribe, and who op-
pose the practice. The Board applied the test for social groups
set forth in Acosta, which defines a "social group" under the 1980
Refugee Act as a group of persons all of whom share a common,
immutable characteristic. The shared characteristic might be an
innate one such as sex, color, or kinship ties, or in some circum-
stances it might be a shared past experience such as former mili-
tary leadership or land ownership. Whatever the common char-
acteristic that defines the group, it must be one that the mem-
bers of the group either cannot change, or should not be
required to change because it is fundamental to their individual
identities or consciences.9 4
Applying the Acosta criterion, the Board declared gender
and tribal affiliation to be immutable characteristics. The court
found intact genitalia to be a characteristic so fundamental to
the individual identity of a young woman that she should not be
required to change it. This categorization of "intact genitalia" as
"fundamental to the individual identity of a young woman" sets
an important precedent for immigration judges previously reluc-
tant to acknowledge FGM as a form of persecution. 91 Having
93. Feminist critics of current asylum law note that while "political opinion" pro-
tects male-dominated activities (such as guerrilla activity, political agitation, and union
activity) and thus persecution of men, no comparable category exists to protect against
the kinds of oppression women generally experience. For example, in a 1987 case, the
applicant had been raped by a military officer who threatened to expose her as a "sub-
versive" if she resisted. To grant her asylum, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit characterized the Salvadoran woman as a person persecuted on the basis of
"political opinion" by imputing to her a "political opinion" against the Salvadoran Gov-
ernment in power at the time. Lazo Majano v. INS, 813 F.2d 1432, 1435 (9th Cir. 1987).
94. In re Acosta, 19 I & N Dec. 211, 233 (BIA 1985), modified on other grounds, In re
Moghrabi, 19 I & N Dec. 439 (BIA 1987).
95. For example, an immigration judge in Baltimore considering the asylum claim
of a woman from Sierra Leone found, as did the court in Kasinga, that the applicant
could not change her gender. The court concluded, however, that the applicant could
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established FGM as a form of persecution, and Kasinga as a
member of a "social group" worthy of refugee status, the Board
had little difficulty in finding the necessary nexus: that Kasinga
faces persecution "on account of' her membership in the class
of women from her tribe who oppose FGM.
The analysis of the critical definition of social group is the
least satisfactory aspect of the majority opinion. What degree of
affiliation or homogeneity is necessary to a social group? Can
the social group be defined primarily by the harm that consti-
tutes the persecution, or is a separate element of linkage neces-
sary? In this respect the concurring opinion of Lory D. Rosen-
berg is the most thoughtful and helpful to future advocacy of
women's claims.
Citing various authorities for the proposition that the social
group category is to be broadly construed as a "catchall" category
beyond political opinion, race, religion or ethnicity, Rosenberg
emphasizes that social group claims, unlike political opinion
claims, are status based and do not necessarily require a showing
that the specific individual's opinions or activities were the cause
of the persecution. In the context of female genital mutilation,
therefore, it is not necessary to demonstrate that the applicant
voiced opposition to the practice. Acknowledging that the 1995
gender guidelines refer INS employees to international human
rights instruments in assessing claims for asylum, Rosenberg
finds support for consideration of gender-related asylum claims
under the social group category based on Canadian jurispru-
dence, the guidance of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refu-
gees,96 and the U.S. and Canadian gender guidelines."
In their concurring opinion, Board members Filppu and
change her mind with regard to her opposition to the FGM practices. The judge made
no effort to determine if her attitudes about FGM (and, thus, her attitudes about the
physical integrity of her genitalia) were "so fundamental to the individual's identity or
conscience that she ought not to be required to change." Memorandum of Decision
and Order [name and case number redacted] (U.S. Immigration Ct., Baltimore, Apr.
28, 1995), available at http://www.uchastings.edu/cgrs/law/ij/40.pdf.
96. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR, Division of Inter-
national Protection, Memorandum: Female Genital Mutilation, U.N. Doc. SUS/HCR/
001 (May 10, 1994) [hereinafter U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees].
97. 8 C.F.R. pts. 103, 204, 205, & 216 (2001); see also Lena H. Sun, INS Expands
Asylum Protection for Women, WASH. POST, June 3, 1995, at A4; Judith Gaines, INS Eases
Asylum Guidelines for Women, BOSTON GLOBE, May 27, 1995, at 13; Michael J. Sniffen,
Immigration Rules Focus on Sexual Violence, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, May 27, 1995, at A12;
CANADIAN IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE BOARD, GUIDELINES ISSUED BY THE CHAIRPERSON
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Heilman respond to the comprehensive arguments offered by
the INS; the concurring opinion of Rosenberg elaborates on the
terse majority opinion. Both concurring opinions illuminate the
broader implications of this purportedly narrow, fact-specific de-
cision. Filppu and Heilman emphasize that both parties agreed
that female genital mutilation could amount to persecution, that
there was an identifiable social group, and that the persecution
was "on account of' the applicant's inclusion in that group.98
The parties differed, however, on the need for a remand and,
most significantly, on the basis for finding FGM to be grounds
for asylum.
The Board's inclusion of "opposition to FGM" as a factor in
defining Kasinga's social group suggests that the Board was not
prepared to address the potential for widespread application for
asylum in the United States by women of Kasinga's tribe in Togo,
or any country in which FGM is widely practiced. The Board
itself pointed out that Kasinga's tribe circumcises young women
and girls at rates approaching one hundred percent. This con-
cern is explicit in the INS's formulation that persecution encom-
passes only practices that "shock the conscience" (although in-
tent to punish is not deemed necessary). As previously noted,
this formulation also anticipates the challenge of cultural activ-
ists that granting asylum to all victims of FGM is an invasion of a
nation's cultural autonomy. Yet cultural relativists focus on "sur-
vival and liberation of African women through their own activ-
ism,"99 and Kasinga has done precisely that-by literally flying
away from a culture whose values she rejects. The Board in Kas-
inga would simply support an applicant's decision to condemn
and reject FGM.
The INS's formulation also seeks to exclude previously cir-
PURSUANT TO SECTION 65(B) OF THE IMMIGRATION ACT: WOMEN REFUGEE CLAIMANTS
FEARING GENDER-RELATED PERSECUTION (1993).
98. In re Kasinga, 20 I & N Dec. at 370 (Filppu, J. & Heilman, J., Concurring).
These Board members suggest that the comprehensive framework offered by the INS
would be more appropriately proposed through the legislative or regulatory process.
99. Lewis, supra note 79. Canada was the first country to formulate gender guide-
lines for asylum; the United States was the second to do so. See Kristin E. Kandt, United
States Asylum Law: Recognizing Persecution Based on Gender Using Canada as a Comparison, 9
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 137 (1995). The gender guidelines are not technically binding on the
Board of Immigration Appeals ("Board") and, therefore, their use in the majority opin-
ion is itself significant. Moreover, concurring Judge Rosenberg questions the failure of
the INS to refer to the gender guidelines in the case. In re Kasinga, 20 I & N Dec. at 370
(Rosenberg, J., Concurring).
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cumcised women because "a woman once circumcised cannot
ordinarily be subjected to FGM a second time."'0 0 This interpre-
tation ignores the larger context in which FGM typically occurs:
cultures that severely limit women's expression, choices, and ac-
tions. The INS's example of a small child as a consenting party
is even more disturbing. This presumption of acquiescence for
children directly conflicts with the recognized rights of children
in the CRC and directly contradicts the position of the U.N.
High Commissioner for Refugees on the inclusion of children
who may be subject to female genital mutilation as refugees.' 0'
Surely with any such permanent and debilitating invasion of
bodily integrity, there should be a presumption of non-acquies-
cence until the individual has reached a level of maturity to
make such a significant personal decision.
The INS also argued for remand on the question of whether
the applicant could avoid female genital mutilation by moving to
another part of Togo. The majority refused to remand, noting
that (1) FGM is widely practiced in Togo; (2) acts of violence
and abuse against women in Togo are tolerated by the police;
(3) the Government of Togo has a poor human rights record;
(4) most African women can expect little government protection
from FGM; and (5) Togo is a small country of approximately
twenty-two thousand square miles, slightly smaller than West Vir-
ginia. The majority also noted that the police were looking for
the applicant, and her husband was a well-known individual who
was a friend of the police. This line of argument and analysis is
itself quite troubling in the context of gender-based violence.
The conditions necessary to establish persecution a fortiori
demonstrate at the least a failure on the part of the relevant gov-
ernment to provide effective protection. The majority's opinion
suggests that the availability of asylum might turn on the status
(or lack of status) of the woman's spouse, the size of the country,
or generally unrealistic expectations that women within tightly
woven tribal cultures and oppressive societies may simply move
from one area of the country to another.
In re Kasinga is one of several cases in recent years brought
before immigration judges by women seeking asylum in the
100. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 20, arts. 12, 19, 24(3), 37.
101. U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, supra note 96.
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United States to protect themselves °2 or their children 10 3 from
FGM. These cases are the latest development in the discussion
of whether and, if so, when, treatment uniquely affecting wo-
men-such as rape,1 °4 domestic violence, 10 5 heab1 0 6 and FGM-
can meet the elements required for asylum.
The decision evades many thorny issues presented by such
cases. It limits its protective impact to "young women not yet
circumcised," and in so doing declines to take a position as to
whether or not the practice of FGM alone suffices to render the
women of a tribe or nation members of a persecuted group. An
immigration judge in Virginia recently took that step, granting
asylum in part on the basis of a woman's resistance to and subse-
quent forcibly imposed circumcision. 10 7 In that case the experi-
ence of FGM established past persecution, and so created a
showing of a "well-founded fear of persecution," itself a rebutta-
ble presumption of future persecution. This ruling contravenes
the INS's proposed formulation, which would exclude all wo-
men already circumcised. At stake is whether women living in a
society that practices FGM can be considered a persecuted class
by virtue of living in such a society-meaning that all such wo-
men, circumcised or not, would meet the "other social group"
criterion of section 101 (a) (42) (A).
In re Kasinga is therefore a qualified success for women's
rights advocates. The door has been opened by the INS's posi-
tion and the Board's decision to recognize FGM as grounds for
asylum. Yet that door may remain closed as a practical matter to
many applicants without the representation, documentation,
and extraordinarily compelling facts available to this particular
applicant. Kasinga was seventeen years old when her saga began;
most children are mutilated much younger, far too young to al-
102. See, e.g., Oral decision of the Immigration Judge [name and case number
redacted] (Office of the Immigration Judge, Oklahoma City, Aug. 30, 1995); Memoran-
dum of Decision and Order [name and case number redacted] (U.S. Immigration Ct.,
Baltimore, Apr. 28, 1995); In re M.K., No. A-72-374-558 (Office of the Immigration
Judge, Arlington, Va., Apr. 20, 1995).
103. See, e.g., In re Oluloro, No. 172-147-491 (Office of the Immigration Judge,
Seattle, Wash., Mar. 23, 1994).
104. Lazo-Majano v. INS, 813 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1987).
105. In re Pierre, 15 I & N Dec. 461 (BIA 1975).
106. Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233 (3d Cir. 1993); but see Fisher v. INS, 79 F.3d 955
(9th Cir. 1996).
107. In re M.K., Deportation Proceedings, A-72-374-558 (U.S. Immigration Ct., Ar-
lington, Va., Aug. 9, 1995).
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low them to seek asylum independently in the United States or
anywhere else.
The inability or unwillingness of the majority to elaborate
on its findings of "persecution," "social group," and the "on ac-
count of" nexus may be nothing more than an exercise in judi-
cial economy, given the general consensus of the opposing par-
ties. The eagerness of the majority to find agreement between
the parties, however, even when in fact they disagreed on some
elements (as in the precise definition of the social group with
respect to personal opposition), suggests that critical points of
analysis may yet be undecided or contentious among the Board
members.
Beyond its surface acceptance of FGM as grounds for asy-
lum, the position of the INS on many of these critical points
would exclude many more applicants than it would accept. First,
only FGM "in its more severe forms" (such as would "shock the
conscience") would qualify. Past victims would almost always be
excluded, and there is, at the very least, the suggestion that small
children who would be subject to the procedure might be ex-
cluded as well. A claimant would have to demonstrate that on
return she would be seized and forcibly subjected to female geni-
tal mutilation; any pressure short of physical force would be in-
sufficient. A possibility of relocation to another part of the coun-
try might defeat the claim, posing the problem that laws that
ostensibly protect women from violence but are never enforced
might yet bar women from being given asylum, and that societal
and family pressure to submit short of physical force, however
severe, would be insufficient grounds for asylum. Also, accord-
ing to the INS brief, the "on account of" nexus is not demon-
strated by a showing that the practice "may play a deeper politi-
cal role or help perpetrate a system of male domination." '
With its emphasis in Kasinga on the extreme form of genital mu-
tilation, the police searching for the applicant, and the unavaila-
bility of relocation, as well as its definition of the social group
with reference to opposition to the practice, the majority opin-
ion (deliberately or otherwise) provides implicit support for a
number of the INS's limiting formulations.
In re Kasinga is, however, the first time a court with national
jurisdiction has recognized that the circumcision of women can
108. Brief of the INS, at 20.
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be a form of persecution. The majority opinion, unfortunately,
is not an easy "road map" for upcoming adjudications, as Rosen-
berg's concurring opinion suggests1 9 (indeed, her own opinion
is much more helpful to future claimants).11O In short, it is diffi-
cult to posit a more striking example of how exclusion of gender
from recognized categories of discrimination and persecution
has precluded full realization of women's rights. Those con-
cerned about protecting women and girls facing FGM will still
have many legal and practical hurdles to overcome in represent-
ing the women who will undoubtedly follow in Kasinga's foot-
steps.
V. SEXUAL VIOLENCE AND EXPLOITATION THROUGH
DECEPTION AND ABUSE OF AUTHORITY UNDER
DOMESTIC LAW
The Thirteenth Amendment prohibits involuntary servi-
tude... and federal law prohibits importation of any person in a
condition of involuntary servitude." 2 Since 1903, U.S. federal
courts have recognized that "voluntary" acceptance of a contract
does not preclude a finding of involuntary servitude if the con-
tractual relationship becomes involuntary due to threats of phys-
ical or legal coercion.1 1 3 Moreover, failure to escape from invol-
untary servitude when an opportunity is provided does not pro-
109. 20 I & N Dec., at 373.
110. The importance of Board decisions should not be underestimated. Federal
district and circuit courts of appeals have been very deferential to Board decisions as an
administrative law matter. See generally Krishna R. Patel, Recognizing the Rape of Bosnian
Women as Gender-Based Persecution, 60 BROOK. L. REv. 929, 946 (1994).
111. The Thirteenth Amendment states: "Neither slavery nor involuntary servi-
tude... shall exist within the United States...." U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. It is not
limited, by its terms, to State action.
112. 18 U.S.C. § 1584 (1994). Indentured servitude, a form of involuntary servi-
tude, is also illegal under the Thirteenth Amendment and an enforcing statute, 18
U.S.C. § 1581 (1994), which prohibits peonage. Peonage is a form of involuntary servi-
tude in which labor is coerced to pay off debt, whether through physical force, legal
sanctions, or threats of either. See Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 215 (1905);
Peonage Cases, 123 F. 671, 682 (M.D. Ala. 1903). Section 1581 would thus seem to be
the most applicable section for the typical mail-order bride situation, in which a woman
provides sexual and domestic services in exchange for residency in the United States
and the husband's tacit agreement not to have her deported. However, peonage repre-
sents a subset of the activities prohibited by § 1584, and courts have thus generally
tended to focus on § 1584, since its definition of involuntary servitude is conveniently
broad.
113. See Peonage Cases, 123 F. at 682.
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hibit a finding of involuntary servitude." 4 In United States v.
Kozminski, the U.S. Supreme Court held that use or threatened
use of physical or legal coercion is sufficient for a determination
of involuntary servitude.' 15 Although the Court stated that psy-
chological pressure alone is insufficient, the victim's "special vul-
nerabilities" are a factor in determining whether the actual or
threatened physical or legal coercion rendered the servitude in-
voluntary." 6 The Court specifically noted that threatening an
immigrant with deportation could be sufficient legal coercion
for a finding of involuntary servitude.' 1 7 Under the First Circuit
Court of Appeals decision in United States v. Alzanki,"8 the "spe-
cial vulnerability" of the victim may include a lack of sophistica-
tion or knowledge on the part of the victim, raising the possibil-
ity of utilizing a more subjective, less objective standard of invol-
untariness.
An extensive body of state law has also developed in the
United States on the elements of coercion and fraud with re-
spect to rape and other sexual contact. Generally rape by fraud
cases involves fraud in medical and other treatment contexts,
false impersonation, sexual scams, and sexual theft. Rape by co-
ercion may involve abuse of authority and sexual extortion.
Most courts addressing these situations have held that the re-
quirement of force or non-consent in rape statutes has not been
satisfied, while noting that the defendant's conduct is morally
reprehensible. Some courts, however, have found "constructive
force" in the coercion situations. In reaction, state legislatures
have adopted a variety of statutes criminalizing such conduct.
These statutes: (1) punish individuals who abuse positions of
trust, or positions of authority to secure sexual conduct; (2) spe-
cifically prohibit use of fraud or deception; (3) substitute coer-
cion and other types of nonphysical force for the physical force
requirement; and (4) prohibit nonconsensual intercourse with-
out reference to force, fraud, or coercion. In many of these stat-
114. See, e.g., Bernal v. United States, 241 F. 339, 341-42 (5th Cir. 1917), cert. denied,
245 U.S. 672 (1918) (finding threats of deportation sufficient to show coercion).
115. 487 U.S. 931, 952 (1988).
116. Id. at 948. Justice Brennan, in his concurring opinion, supported an interpre-
tation of involuntary servitude that would prohibit any means of coercion that breaks
another person's will such that she or he is reduced to a condition of servitude resem-
bling that of a chattel slave. See id. at 961-65.
117. See id. at 948.
118. 54 F.3d 994 (1st Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1111 (1996).
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utes sexual contact obtained without physical force is subject to a
lesser punishment." 9
Most cogent to the current analysis are the possible norma-
tive standards for criminalization of the solicitor's conduct for
fraud or coercion in obtaining sexual relations. The traditional
test in the fraud context is the highly criticized distinction be-
tween fraud in the factum versus fraud in the inducement. 120
The rule is that if there is fraud in the fact itself (a doctor tells a
woman that sexual intercourse is a pelvic exam) there is invalid
consent and rape; if there is only fraud in the inducement (the
doctor says sexual intercourse is the cure for her cancer) there is
consent and thus no rape. 121 The examples given above illus-
trate one of the principal criticisms of the rule: the distinction
has no correlation to the level of coerciveness involved. The rule
has been widely criticized by academic commentators and re-
jected in some form or another by most state statutes addressing
rape by fraud.
The academic literature proposing other formulations can
be generally divided into three concepts: (1) voluntariness or
autonomy; (2) materiality; and (3) totality of the circum-
stances. 122 Feinberg proposes that the central question should
be whether the fraud reduces the voluntariness of consent to a
level that should not be recognized as legally effective. Under
his proposal, criminal law should punish the wealthy man who
falsely promises to financially assist the mother of a sick child in
return for sexual favors but not if he offers a desirable but not
desperately needed alternative to the woman. 123 Shulhofer fo-
cuses on which inducements infringe on sexual autonomy, spe-
cifically mentioning as subject to criminalization falsehoods
about pecuniary interest, nondisclosure, or misrepresentation
involving significant health risks and deceptions "intended to
create feelings of isolation, physical jeopardy, or economic inse-
curity. ' 124 The broadest formulations, by Bogart, Larson, and
119. Patricia J. Falk, Rape by Fraud and Rape by Coercion, 64 BROOK. L. REv. 39
(1998).
120. Id. at 157.
121. Id. at 158.
122. Id. at 162.
123. Joel Feinberg, Victims' Excuses: The Case of Fraudulently Procured Consent, 96
ETHICS 330, 344-45 (1986).
124. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Taking Sexual Anatomy Seriously: Rape Law and Beyond,
11 L. & PHIL. 35, 92 (1992).
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Bok, encompass any situation "(w) here participation is not will-
ing, not chosen freely, not chosen without the application of ex-
ternal pressures .... -125 The difficulty with all these formula-
tions in the trafficking context is that autonomy is illusory for
many women in cultures in which they are subordinated. 126
West suggests that each of these formulations is misguided in
focusing on consent rather than the legitimacy or illegitimacy of
the pressures utilized. 1
27
Under the materiality approach: (1) the misrepresentation
must be material, (2) the victim's reliance must be reasonable,
and (3) the actor must have intended to mislead when making
the misrepresentation. 12' The difficulty frequently noted with
this approach is the evaluation of emotional inducements under
the materiality standard.129 Harris is a principal proponent of
"totality of the circumstances" test in deciding whether the vic-
tim consented to sexual intercourse.1 30
Academic and state legislative formulations are more expan-
sive than the traditional test and thus more protective of victims'
rights. Although the materiality test seems to be gaining the
most acceptance, the coerciveness of the pressures brought to
bear on the victim is also gaining acceptance.1 3 1
There is more widespread agreement among courts, legisla-
tures, and commentators that rape by coercion should be
criminalized, struggling more over drawing the line between co-
ercion and bargain. The Model Penal Code 1 2 and several court
decisions' 3 3 identify coercion as overwhelming the victim's will,
while a bargain is merely offering "an unattractive choice to
avoid some unwanted alternative. '"134 Estrich 3 5 and Dripps136
125. Id. at 93.
126. SeeJ. H. Bogart, On the Nature of Rape, 5 PtuB. AFF. Q. 117, 118 (1991); see also
Jane E. Larson, "Women Understand So Little, They Call My Good Nature Deceit:" A Feminist
Rethinking of Seduction, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 374 (1993); SISSELA BOK, LYING: MORAL
CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE (1999).
127. Robert L. West, Legitimizing the Illegitimate: A Comment on Beyond Rape, 93
COLUM. L. REv. 1442, 1459 (1993).
128. Falk, supra note 119, at 166.
129. Id. at 167.
130. Lucy Reed Harris, Comment Towards a Consent Standard in the Law of Rape, 43
U. CHI. L. REv. 613 (1976).
131. Falk, supra note 119, at 169-72.
132. Model Penal Code § 213.1 cmt. at 312.
133. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Mlinarich, 542 A.2d 1335 (Pa. 1988).
134. Model Penal Code § 213.1 cmt. at 314.
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propose that obtaining sex by extortion should be punished in
the same way as the law prohibits obtaining money by extortion.
Consistent with his criticism of the autonomy approach to fraud,
West suggests the line should be drawn between legitimate and
illegitimate inducements.137 Shulhofer 38 and Chamallas139 have
attempted to draw the line more precisely. Schulhofer recog-
nizes four categories of illegitimate pressures: (1) extortionate
behavior; (2) institutional or professional authority; (3) eco-
nomic power; and (4) deception.1 4 0 Chamallas proposes a test
of "mutuality" to separate acceptable from exploitative sexual of-
fenses, similarly concluding that mutuality does not exist if there
is physical force, deception, or economic pressure. 41 Chamallas
recognizes the difficulty of distinguishing between coercion and
bargain, but concludes: "I discern a trend here to regard eco-
nomic pressure as an unacceptable inducement to sex and to
create a range of legal sanctions to discourage economically co-
erced encounters, even if such sex is not subject to direct crimi-
nal sanctions.' 4 2 Although both of these commentators recog-
nize economic pressure as coercion, the least developed area of
the law and commentary on coercion is the line between unac-
ceptable economic pressure and acceptable economic induce-
ment.
VI. ECONOMIC COERCION VITIATING A STATE'S CONSENT
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
In all of the voluminous academic debate over whether a
woman can consent to prostitution or other sexual services,
there appears to be no mention of international law provisions
which recognize that even a State's consent can be negated by
economic coercion. Article 50 of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties allows invalidation of a State's consent when it
135. Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L. J. 1087, 1120 (1986).
136. Donald A. Dripps, Beyond Rape: An Essay on the Difference Between the Presence of
Force and the Absence of Consent, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1780 (1992).
137. West, supra note 127, at 1459.
138. Stephen Schulhofer, The Feminist Challenge in CriminalLaw, 143 U. PA. L. REv.
2151, 2180 (1995).
139. Martha Chamallas, Consent Equality and the Legal Control of Sexual Conduct, 61 S.
CAL. L. REv. 777, 814 (1988).
140. Schulhofer, supra note 138.
141. Chamallas, supra note 139, at 836-37.
142. Id. at 830.
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has been procured through "corruption" of the State's represen-
tative,143 or under Article 51 through undefined "coercion" of
the State's representative.14 4 The Charter of the Organization of
American States145 contains explicit prohibitions on the use of
economic force by one State against another. In the prohibition
on intervention in another State's affairs in Article 18, the Char-
ter states that the principle "prohibits not only armed force but
also any other form of interference or attempted threat against
the personality of the State or against its political, economic, and
cultural elements. ' 146 The concept is reaffirmed in Article 19:
"No State may use or encourage the use of coercive measures of
an economic or political character in order to force the sover-
eign will of another State and obtain from it advantages of any
kind." '147 There are also any number of international declara-
tions and other instruments prohibiting economic coercion to
obtain advantages from another State. In this context it is suffi-
cient to note the obvious implication. If a State's consent to rela-
tionships and contracts can be negated by economic coercion
under international law, why shouldn't the consent of economi-
cally powerless women be treated the same?
VII. DRAWING THE LINE BETWEEN ECONOMIC COERCION
AND ECONOMIC INDUCEMENT
Under the Protocol, "trafficking in persons" occurs when-
ever any of the following means are used or threatened: (1)
force; (2) other forms of coercion; (3) abduction; (4) fraud; (5)
deception; (6) the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerabil-
ity; and (7) the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to
achieve the consent of a person having control over another per-
son. Under these provisions, deliberate exploitation of eco-
nomic hardship, without any accompanying deceptive or mis-
leading measures, is most appropriately addressed as "coercion"
or "abuse of power or . . . vulnerability." Although it may be
143. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, concluded at Vienna, May 23,
1969 (entered into force, Jan. 27, 1980), U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27, 8 I.L.M. 679
(1969), art. 50.
144. Id. art. 51.
145. Charter of the Organization of American States, concluded at Bogota, Apr.
30, 1948 (entered into force, Dec. 13, 1951) 2 U.S.T. 2394, T.I.A.S. No. 2361, 119
U.N.T.S. 3.
146. Id. art. 18.
147. Id. art. 19.
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argued that the placement of "coercion" in Article 3 following
"force" suggests it is limited to physical force, the expansive defi-
nition in Article 3 and the broadly inclusive intent of the drafters
demonstrates otherwise.
Initially, three fundamental points of interpretation bear re-
peating. First, exploitation of economic hardship is arguably
one of several means of procuring sexual services that is prohib-
ited by the definition of sexual trafficking. There are other ele-
ments, most importantly that the acts be done "for the purpose
of exploitation," which must be satisfied. Secondly, it is clear
that the intent of Article 3 was to cover as broadly as possible the
means prohibited, so long as the prohibited acts and mens rea for
trafficking are satisfied. Third, the broad inclusion of impermis-
sible means is underlined by the clarification in Article 3 (b) that
consent of the victim is irrelevant when any of the impermissible
means are utilized or threatened. The Protocol itself, therefore,
in its intent and language, is susceptible to the broadest possible
interpretation of "coercion" and "abuse of power and... vulner-
ability."
Trafficking under the Protocol is in and of itself a form of
conduct which has been deemed to cause sufficient societal
harm to merit criminal punishment, aside from whether the
means utilized are in and of themselves criminal. Moreover,
there is a vigorous moral and academic debate over whether
prostitution is so exploitative of women that any woman could
ever be said to have freely engaged in prostitution. Regardless of
the outcome of that normative debate, in the context of traffick-
ing anyone who procures and benefits from the sexual services
of another with the necessary mens rea and acts for trafficking has
engaged in sufficient conduct and manifested sufficient will to
cause the harms the crime of trafficking was designed to punish.
Even if a woman can freely and voluntarily choose to engage in
prostitution, that does not mean that the person who procures
her services and transports her, intending to exploit her, should
be immune from criminal punishment.
If all procurement and transport for exploitation is not to
be criminalized as trafficking, however, the question remains as
to when exploitation of economic necessity or hardship is suffi-
ciently coercive within the Protocol's definition. A woman may
be economically powerless as a result of her individual circum-
stances, her lack of status in civil society, or both. The Kasinga
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case is instructive in this context. Kasinga came from a promi-
nent, well-to-do family. Due to the inheritance laws and customs
upon her father's death, however, she had no financial resources
and no control over what could be done to her own body. The
Board of Immigration Appeals considered both the societal cir-
cumstances in Togo and Kasinga's own personal situation in
finding that her fear she would be "forcibly" circumcised was rea-
sonable. Evaluating the coerciveness of the situation to distin-
guish coercion from bargain is unavoidably fact-specific, as are
so many other legal determinations, which have not been ex-
cluded from criminalization for that reason alone. A "totality of
the circumstances" test would allow for evaluation of the individ-
ual's circumstances, as well as consideration of the societal and
human rights background of the country and culture from
which she comes.
Allowing for economic coercion to satisfy the "means" ele-
ment of the Protocol is not only consistent with the intent of the
Protocol, it is necessary to effectuate its intent. The sparse statis-
tical information on trafficking does indicate that recruitment of
women and children for trafficking is, not surprisingly, concen-
trated on women from States and cultures in which they have
few or no economic alternatives to prostitution and other forms
of sexual services. These women are chosen precisely because
they are in no position to negotiate other options. The traf-
ficker's offer is, quite simply, an offer they cannot refuse.
The limited but needed consequences of recognizing eco-
nomic coercion under the Protocol must be fully understood.
"Broadening" the definition of coercion in the Protocol allows
for States to recognize economic coercion with their domestic
implementation laws. Any State choosing not to adopt such an
interpretation would not be found to be in violation of the treaty
because it could not be said that the Protocol so unequivocally
demands this interpretation that the State would be in material
breach of its treaty obligations. As a result, a more restrictive
interpretation of coercion would unnecessarily curtail a permis-
sible, and socially preferable, State option.
As a practical matter, recognizing economic coercion would
in almost all cases expand only the group of victims to be pro-
tected under Article 6, and not the group of perpetrators under
Articles 3 and 4. A putative sexual trafficker will in all likelihood
utilize at least one of the other prohibited means in addition to
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economic coercion. There may, however, be identifiable groups
of putative victims who have been exploited solely through ex-
ploitation of their otherwise unescapable and dire economic cir-
cumstances by that trafficker. If a State has manifested its will-
ingness to make its social resources available to these victims in
adopting or allowing for economic coercion in implementation
and interpretation of its domestic legislation, there is a clear so-
cial benefit to providing protection and services to these victims.
The more difficult normative question at that point becomes
why these victims, motivated solely by economic hardship, are
more deserving of protection than any other economic refugee.
Having chosen to differentiate between alien workers and vic-
tims of sexual trafficking by having two separate Protocols, the
drafters of the Protocols have recognized such a distinction,
however fine it may be in some factual circumstances. The ques-
tion remains as to whether it is a valid distinction as a matter of
public policy.
First, the formulation for economic coercion as posited
above would require extreme economic hardship on a personal
level, or what may be termed "economic persecution" on the ba-
sis of gender on a more widespread basis. Such a formulation
differentiates the victim of sexual trafficking through economic
coercion from the illegal alien seeking escape generally from ec-
onomic circumstances in the State of origin. The systemic lack
of economic alternatives makes the trafficking victim's situation
more exploitative than the worker who continues to have at least
the possibility of alternative employment, however difficult or in-
sufficient that alternative may be. The most difficult case to dis-
tinguish is that of the purported victim of sexual trafficking
whose economic desperation is limited to her own personal cir-
cumstances rather than a lack of other economic alternatives
within the State, culture, or locale of her origin. Again, as a
practical matter, such a situation may be assumed to be relatively
uncommon, but relevant nevertheless to the normative question
of what the standard should be. To put this question in a factual
context, why is the woman who places herself in the hands of a
sexual trafficker in order to feed her children deserving of more
protection than the father with the same motivation who is
smuggled into another country to seek employment?
A distinction may be drawn on both the level of the traf-
ficker/alien smuggler and the trafficking victim/illegal alien.
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The smuggler of illegal aliens under the relevant Protocol bene-
fits from the act of transportation alone. However horrendous
the conditions of transport may be, the alien worker enters into
the transaction willing to undergo a short-term risk and hardship
for long-term economic gain. If the promise of economic gain
never materializes, it is a risk the worker has assumed and from
which the smuggler receives no loss or benefit. If the smuggler
does have a financial interest in the employment of the worker
and the conditions are abusive, deceptive, or otherwise exploita-
tive, the smuggler may then be treated as a trafficker rather than
simply a smuggler and subject to the criminal provisions of the
Trafficking Protocol.
More importantly, the victim of sexual trafficking is necessa-
rily subjected to harm, deceit, and hazards the risk of which she
did not assume by virtue of the fact that trafficking must have as
its ultimate purpose "exploitation." By analogy to general princi-
ples of contract law, there is not simply unequal bargaining
power between the parties-there is not and could not be a
"meeting of the minds." Inherent in the definition of exploita-
tion is the imposition of harm that no rational person, however
desperate, would ever accept willingly. With both the alien
worker and the victim of trafficking, they are drawn into an
agreement by the promise of being "better off' than before.
With the alien worker, there is at the least that possibility or, to
put it more precisely, the smuggler is not involved in actions
which prevent or impede that possibility. In the trafficking situa-
tion, the victim may hope for a better situation, but that possibil-
ity is precluded by the trafficker and the plans he or she has
made for the victim. The trafficker benefits directly from the
exploitation of the victim and, in the case of prostitution, from
the victim's sexual services. The trafficker has every incentive to
ensure the exploitative working relationship continues, which
the victim does not. In short, what the trafficker contemplates as
the bargain from the victim is not what any person would be
willing to provide-a lifetime subject to exploitation. It is not
necessary to conclude that prostitution itself is always or almost
always exploitative to accept this conclusion that what the traf-
ficker contemplates for his victim is fundamentally and irrecon-
cilably different from what the victim contemplates as her own
future. The means which must be utilized by a trafficker to ob-
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tain and maintain the exploitation of the victim would not be
necessary otherwise.
